Abstract-Detecting misbehavior (such as transmissions of false information) in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is a very important problem with wide range of implications, including safety related and congestion avoidance applications. We discuss several limitations of existing misbehavior detection schemes (MDS) designed for VANETs. Most MDS are concerned with detection of malicious nodes. In most situations, vehicles would send wrong information because of selfish reasons of their owners, e.g. for gaining access to a particular lane. It is therefore more important to detect false information than to identify misbehaving nodes. We introduce the concept of data-centric misbehavior detection and propose algorithms which detect false alert messages and misbehaving nodes by observing their actions after sending out the alert messages. With the data-centric MDS, each node can decide whether an information received is correct or false. The decision is based on the consistency of recent messages and new alerts with reported and estimated vehicle positions. No voting or majority decisions is needed, making our MDS resilient to Sybil attacks. After misbehavior is detected, we do not revoke all the secret credentials of misbehaving nodes, as done in most schemes. Instead, we impose fines on misbehaving nodes (administered by the certification authority), discouraging them to act selfishly. This reduces the computation and communication costs involved in revoking all the secret credentials of misbehaving nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) consists of vehicles (also referred to as nodes), road side units (RSUs) and certification authorities (CAs), whose goal is to ensure road safety and help in secure transfer of messages and data. Communication can either be vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) (e.g. relaying alert information) or vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) (e.g. when the vehicle needs to report some event to the RSU/CA). Security in VANETs is important, because the message sent by one vehicle might have important consequences such as accident prevention.
VANETs are a class of ephemeral networks [10] , where the connection between vehicles (nodes) is short lived. The network topology changes very frequently, as nodes move in and out of range of each other. The density of the network also changes over time, e.g. during rush hours. These characteristics make VANET very challenging for dealing with security issues.
Human behavioral tendencies will be reflected in the movement of the vehicles (rational behavior). Vehicles can issue false alerts due to either some internal failure and false alerts (faulty nodes), or intentionally for selfish reasons (malicious nodes). Malicious nodes might have criminal motives to cause accidents and may also attempt to gather sensitive information about other nodes, e.g. credit card number from RFID signals at an electronic toll station.
Current research on security in VANETs has been focused on location privacy, maintaining authenticity of data and revocation of certificates and secret credentials. Surveys on the security challenges in VANETs can be found in [7] , [9] . Location privacy is achieved by assigning several pseudonyms (or aliases) [10] to each vehicle, such that two or more pseudonyms belonging to one vehicle cannot be linked together. Authentication techniques rely on signatures, a message is signed with a private key to verify if a user has the corresponding public key. A certificate is also issued to verify the validity of the public key. Signature schemes for VANETs have been studied extensively, e.g. ECMV [16] .
The issues in revocation problem are whether to maintain a list of all revoked certificates and keys or revoked vehicles or some seed to deduce the list of revoked vehicles [15] , [2] . Revocation of certificates and secret credentials has the following disadvantages. The certificate revocation list (CRL) containing all the certificates of revoked vehicles, has to be sent to all the nodes in the network. This approach requires a huge bandwidth, if the number of revoked nodes is high. Our approach considers that revocation might not be necessary, because a node which misbehaves once, for selfish reasons, might send correct information at other times. It is important, and sometimes necessary, not to disregard the correct information.
In this paper, we assume that nodes misbehave mostly because of selfish reasons. For example, vehicle might send false report on congestion, accident or road block. It is conceivable to believe that a vehicle does not have intentions of causing accidents. Each vehicle normally sends valid and useful information. If all the certificates are revoked, then useful information sent will be ignored. Therefore, we argue that one do not need to classify vehicles according to their overall behavior, but instead to distinguish between correct and false information received from the vehicle. It is important to identify false data and the sender efficiently, because a delay of even one second might cause an accident. The problem of identifying false data is termed as data-centric misbehavior detection in contrast to entity-centric misbehavior detection, where the main goal is to find out and penalize a misbehaving node. The idea of datacentric misbehavior detection stems from Raya's work [10] on data-centric trust, where the author considers trust on information rather than on the source of information.
Once we detect that a node has send false information, this message is sent to the CA, through the RSUs. The CA does not revoke the secret credentials (keys/certificates) of the node. Instead, the misbehaving node receives a fine, depending upon its action. It can keep on sending information which might not necessarily be malicious. The payment of fines would hopefully discourage nodes from sending further false messages. We will show that our approach saves computation and communication bandwidth, which are high due to revocation expenses.
We would like to detect alerts such that emergency breaking, approaching emergency vehicles, road feature notifications, change of lanes, etc. A list of such alerts is given in Table II . Our approach takes into account the alert sent by a vehicle and compares it with its action taken in response to the alert. If it is not a valid action, then the alert is false.
A. Intrusion detection in mobile ad hoc networks
Intrusion detection has been studied extensively in the context of wireless ad hoc networks. Existing intrusion detection techniques, that are applied in MANETs, are not applicable for detecting malicious behavior in VANETs. Most schemes like SCAN [17] , monitor neighboring nodes and decide by a majority voting, if the node is misbehaving. In VANETs nodes move in and out of range very quickly and there might not be enough nodes (threshold) in the vicinity to vote against a misbehaving node. Other game theory based intrusion detection schemes [3] , [12] assign fixed costs for misbehaviors and fixed benefits for their detection. These cannot be used in VANETs as is. Because of its ephemeral nature, the costs (for misbehaviors) and benefits (to detect them) will change continuously.
In a nutshell, the detection itself is application and scenario dependent. Solutions based on trust management are not feasible in VANETs, because neighborhood may change quickly and therefore, trust relationships could be short lived and difficult to even establish in the first place. In relatively static neighborhood graphs (e.g. in congested areas), neighbors may not have history of misbehavior so the first violation cannot be automatically detected. Also, RSU may not be available to facilitate misbehavior detection and penalize accordingly.
B. Related work on misbehavior detection and their limitations
The first existing solution to misbehavior detection problem in VANETs, by Golle et al [6] , creates a model of the network. This model is the set of all possible events in the network. An event which is observed by another node is checked with the model. If it is valid, according to the model, then it is considered to be a correct message, otherwise a false one. The main problem with this approach is that it has not been shown how this model can be created and maintained. For VANETs, building up a global database (as pointed out in [6] ) can be very expensive and impractical. Another problem is that the scheme does not provide location privacy.
VANETs are prone to Sybil attacks [4] , in which a node forges multiple identities. Sybil nodes can influence the decision taken during voting during misbehavior detection and revocation. Some solutions [18] , [8] have been devised to detect such nodes in VANETs. The schemes assume that the precise location of nodes are known. However, a malicious node can give false location information and defeat these schemes.
Raya et al [11] proposed a scheme to detect and revoke malicious nodes. Corresponding to each pseudonym, there is one public/private key pair and a certificate issued by the CA. To revoke a node, its certificates are revoked. Their scheme consists of three components: (1) Revocation of Trusted Component (RTC), (2) a Misbehavior Detection System (MDS), and (3) a Local Revocation Protocol by Voting Evaluators(LEAVE). MDS and LEAVE requires an honest majority, meaning that a benign node must be surrounded by more benign nodes than selfish/malicious ones. So, the scheme fails when there are too many misbehaving nodes around a benign node.
Ghosh et al [5] investigated post crash scenarios. They compared the expected and actual trajectory to decide if a node is sending the correct post crash notification (PCN) alert. The expected trajectory has been modeled using node's possible behavior. For example, a lazy node might not take any action until it is very close to the site of crash. On the other hand a risk-averse node might move away very far from the site of crash. There are three aspects to be noted: the modeling of expected trajectory, the reported position of the node and the actual position of the node. They assume that a node always sends a valid location information. This is not a valid assumption, because the nodes might send wrong location information and compel other nodes to believe that their trajectory is what is expected. Even a small change in position can make a huge difference, for example lane change.
We address more general types of reported information compared to [5] . Nodes can send any kind of information, either different alerts or lane changing information. The other vehicles should be able to verify the validity of the message content from the subsequent location information. We also address the problem of verifying the validity of location information reported by neighbors. If wrong information is detected, the CA is contacted via the nearest RSU. CA knows the mapping of the pseudonym to the actual node ID of the misbehaving node.
C. Our contribution

1)
We propose a new model of VANET where we assume that most misbehaviors arise out of selfish reasons. However, our model can also handle misbehavior from malicious nodes. 2) Misbehavior is detected by observing alerts raised by a node and its subsequent actions. 3) We do not revoke misbehaving nodes, but impose fines on them. This reduces the communication and computation costs in calculating, transmitting, and storing certificate revocation lists. 4) Our approach does not rely on voting schemes and group associations. Therefore, it is immune to Sybil attacks. 5) False location information can be detected in addition to detecting false alert messages. Our network model, definitions and notations are presented in Section II. We present our misbehavior detection scheme in Section III. We compare MDS schemes in Section IV and show that our scheme, without revocation, performs better than the ones with revocation. We conclude in Section V with some open problems.
II. MODEL, DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
The network consists of a set N nodes of |N | = N nodes. Vehicles are denoted by n i (also called nodes). There are road side units (RSU), Certification Authorities (CA) C i and a Master Authority MA. We assume a one way traffic network, consisting of three lanes. Table I gives the notations that we follow throughout the rest of the paper. We use nodes and vehicles interchangeably.
The MA is headed by the government of a State or Province. Each Province is divided into several smaller regions each having a local authority, named CA. The CAs are government agencies that maintain records of vehicles and their owners, and issue unique identities as license plates and secret credentials like 
Distance between l it and l jt pseudonyms, public/private keys and certificates. We use the authentication scheme ECMV [16] which suits our purpose. It has an hierarchical structure with several CAs. We assume that the CAs are trustworthy and has authority over all vehicles registered locally. A node can send several types of messages. We deal only with two types: The alert messages are important to send safety information, so that actions can be taken and accidents can be prevented. EEBL alerts that a vehicle is decelerating rapidly, so that the rear vehicles can prevent rear-end collisions. PCN alerts are sent by vehicles warning other vehicles of an accident which has already occurred. RHCN reports of road conditions like "slippery road" or "ice" or unwanted debris on the road. SVA alerts that a vehicle is moving slowly. RFN alerts of speed limits near schools and hospitals or a sudden bend or steep slope. CCW sends information about possible collisions that should be avoided. CVW warns vehicles about possible violations of traffic signals. These conditions are sent by nodes to other nodes behind them. The alert EVA might also be sent by nodes to other nodes approaching from behind.
There is a list of invalid events (LIE), which shows invalid actions after an alert is issued. This is given in Table II . LIE consists of the first and third columns and is stored in each vehicle. SCHEME We observe that
III. PROPOSED MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION
Each vehicle has an on board unit (OBU), which is loaded with a public/private key pair, 
where, p it ∈ P i is the pseudonym of the node n i which generated the alert at time t ∈ τ , T ∈ T is the type of alert, which can be one of the alerts which have already been discussed, L j ∈ L is the location of the event E j for which the alert was generated, t ∈ τ is the time at which the alert message had been sent, l it ∈ L is the location of the node n i which generated the alert at time t. A node that receives an alert message from a neighboring node, relays it to other nodes and RSUs in its vicinity.
A relay alert, denoted by M R is a tuple,
where, p it ∈ P i is the pseudonym of the node n i who sends the relay alert, t ∈ τ is the time at which M R was sent and M A ∈ M is the alert message that it is relaying. A beacon sent by a node is denoted by B and is a three tuple
where, p i ∈ P i is the pseudonym of the node, t ∈ τ is the time at which the beacon was sent, and l it ∈ L is the location of the node. Suppose a node n i , having a pseudonym p it2 at time t 2 receives an alert message M A , from a node n j (with pseudonym p jt1 ), it first checks if it has a valid signature. This can be done by ECMV [16] . If the node p jt1 has a valid signature, then n i notes the time t 1 from the message
. L x is the location of the event for which the alert was generated. In some cases, for example lane change information it is possible that L x = l jt1 .
We define a threshold time F T after which a message becomes stale. F T is also known as period of freshness. If t 2 − t 1 > F T , then it means that n j had sent it long back and has become stale. So n i discards the message M A . If the message is fresh then the position of the event L x and the location of node l jt1 is noted. If the positions are contradictory, then no action is taken for the alert and the message is discarded. The positions are contradictory, if the order of location is anything other than n i −n j −E x or E x −n j −n i . The first condition arises when the event has occurred in front of n j and n j is sending a message to the node n i behind it. For example, there is an accident at E and an emergency breaking alert is raised by n j , or there is road hazard like water or ice on road. The second condition arises when the event has occurred behind n j and n j is sending a message to the node n i , which is in front of it. For example, if there is an emergency vehicle approaching from behind. So node n j reports to n i (who is in front of it) to make space for the vehicle approaching from behind.
If the positions are correct, then the node n i considers the alert. Then, it checks the alert type and prepares to take actions. We will present in the next section, how to detect incorrect location information. The node n i might receive more that one alert message from different nodes. We do not, however make a decision on the validity of the alert based on the number of vehicles that report the alert, because we do not rely on voting.
After receiving an alert message, the node n i waits for beacons from n j for a time period oft. It verifies the position of the node n j from all the beacons it receives during this time period. When the node n i receives beacon message from the node n j , it checks the position L x in the alert message and the position l jt3 of the beacon message M B = (p jt3 , t 3 , l jt3 ) . It checks the LIE (Table  II) to see if the alert type contradicts with the position. If it does, then n i sends out an alert message which is the negation of the previous message. It also reports the nearest RSU and convicts node n j for sending false message. If node n i does not receive any beacon from n j in timet after receiving an alert message from n j , then it assumes that the pseudonym has changed. Changing pseudonym within a timet is considered to be a misbehavior and so n i reports the RSU that n j is misbehaving.
A. How to detect incorrect location information
In the previous section, we assumed that the location information send in the alert message or in the beacons is correct. However, a clever malicious node will also send incorrect location information, along with the false alert message. In this section we show how to detect incorrect location information. Studder et al [14] have presented how to detect nodes moving in a straight line and transmitting false location information. The decision to convict a node depends on the number of votes casted against it. If a node is surrounded by many corrupt nodes, then a node cannot be convicted. The authors also show that if the first two nodes in the straight line (convoy) send false messages, then they cannot be detected. In our scheme it is very likely that the first node transmits a false alert or beacon with wrong position information. So we cannot use the limited incorrect location detection approach of Studder et al.
Suppose a node n j sends a beacon at time t 1 , then suppose n i (in communication range of n j ) receives the message at time t 2 . Then t 2 is given by
where c is the speed of light. Suppose, node n j wants to fake its location as l jt 1 , so it sends a beacon with the information (p jt1 , t 1 , l jt 1 ). Node n i receives it at time t 2 . Node n i finds out that n j is lying because Eq(1) does not hold. To convince n i , that it is not lying, node n j should also change the time stamp when the beacon is sent. The time t 1 at which it must send the message, so that n j receives it at t 2 , is given by [6] No Yes No Zhou et al [18] No No Yes Ghosh et al [5] No No No Ours Yes Yes Yes So,
Hence, node n j sends a beacon (p jt1 , t 1 , l jt 1 ) to convince n i that it is sending the correct message. However, since node n j does not know the distance between itself and the node n i accurately, it cannot accurately calculate t 1 . When node n i observes the time stamp t 1 and the false location l jt 1 , then any node can calculate the expected position and verify it according to equation (1). On receiving the message M A , a node n j first checks the authenticity of the message using ECMV [16] . If the message is not stale (t 2 − t 1 < F T ) and the order of the vehicles is
, then node n i waits for beacons from n j . It checks this for timet. Suppose n i receives a beacon message M B = (p jt3 , t 3 , l jt3 ) from n j at time t 3 . n i first checks the validity of the location using Eq(1). It then looks up in LIE for event E x . If the action is invalid, then it reports misbehavior and broadcast the negation of the message. If action is correct, then it broadcasts the message M B . A variable count, keeps track of the number of beacons received during the intervalt. If no beacon is received, then it implies that the node n j has changed its pseudonym and this is reported as misbehavior. We have omitted the pseudocode and detailed explanation due the lack of space. We present the pseudocode in [13] .
However it is possible that node n i is falsely accusing node n j . In this case the RSU will reject the accusation and convict n i . The other cars will be warned by the RSU that n i is misbehaving.
B. Reporting misbehaviors and action taken thereafter
After a node detects that another node is misbehaving, it sends out such an information to all other nodes and the nearest RSU. The RSU upon receiving messages about a node behavior, compares with its own observations and reports to the CA the pseudonym of the misbehaving node, along with the reason for accusing it. Only the CA can match the pseudonym with the original identity of the node. The CA then issues negative points to the node, which has to pay it as a fine, depending on the number of negative points received. Our assumptions are based on the fact that, any misbehaving node does so, mainly due to selfish reasons and is most likely not to send false messages all the time. A large number of misbehaviors can be interpreted as dangerous behavior. Such nodes can be revoked off their certificates and other secret credentials using the revocation scheme in PASS [15] .
C. How to deal with compromised RSUs
RSUs are prone to compromise. However, compromising a RSU is more difficult than compromising a node. Compromised RSUs can either transmit false messages or convict benign nodes. A RSU which transmits false messages can be noticed by other nodes, which reports it to the next RSU. If the RSU receives a large number of such reports over a period of time, then the RSU is considered to be compromised. If the message sent by a node has been modified by the RSU, then the convicted node can prove it using its signature. We note that in ECMV [16] certificates are not created by the RSUs. So RSUs cannot fake the signature on the messages sent by the nodes. The nodes can then prove their message authenticity, using the signatures on the messages.
Once it is known that an RSU has been compromised, its certificate is revoked using the techniques in ECMV scheme. We note that the RSUs are fewer in number, if compared to the nodes. So broadcasting a CRL for RSUs will not be expensive.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
We compare our scheme with existing MDS schemes in Table  III . Our scheme has all the desirable properties like location privacy, ability to detect false location information and immunity against Sybil attacks.
In our scheme we have used ECMV [16] for authentication which fits into the hierarchical structure of our network. The transmission delay is only 6.47ms (as stated in [16] ). The time taken for certificate verification is 14.7ms and for signature verification is 9.6ms. (3T par + 2T mul and 2T par + T mul where T par = 4.5ms and T mul = 0.6ms). According to our algorithm, there is no extra communication overhead for revocation list, because only the identity of the misbehaving node is sent to the nearest RSU. The other nodes need not check any CRL list before then send their message. The message transmitted is simply the negation of the transmitted message which involves the same cost. Since CRL is not needed in our scheme, communication overhead is greatly reduced as compared to other schemes. In Fig 1, we show the communication overhead incurred by different schemes. We consider the Hybrid scheme by Calandriello et al [2] , ECMV scheme [16] , PASS [15] and LEAVE [11] . We see that LEAVE incurs a high communication overhead, compared with [2] , [16] and [15] .
V. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the limitations of existing misbehavior detection schemes in VANETs and proposed a new scheme. We introduce the concept of data-centric MDS, where we classify data as "false" or "correct" instead of classifying nodes as "good" and "bad". The main reason for this is that nodes misbehave mainly because of selfish reasons. Our scheme does not revoke the misbehaving nodes or certificates and credentials and thus save communication bandwidth and computation cycles. Our scheme provides location privacy, by the use of pseudonyms. Carrying out real time simulations is left as a future work.
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